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T
he  California  Community  Reinvestment  Corporation  (CCRC)  is  a  nonprofit 
Community Development Financial Institution (CDFI) formed by a consortium 
of California commercial banks in 1989 to provide permanent mortgages for 
affordable housing projects. The corporation has funded over $360 million in first 
mortgages, most secured by Low Income Housing Tax Credit projects.
  CCRC provides long-term mortgage and bond financing for new construction, 
acquisition, and rehabilitation. Funded by more than fifty member banks in California 
providing in excess of $360 million in resources, CCRC offers CRA lending, investment, 
and service test credit to commercial banks and savings and loans through a variety of loan 
pools, investments, and service opportunities. Historically, CCRC has funded its mortgage 
program through a credit line provided by its fifty member banks, but it has bumped up 
against its credit limit as it has increased loan production.
  One solution to this problem has been selling loans to free up credit-line availability 
for new loans. CCRC had bad experiences with early efforts to sell loans to federal agencies. 
But in the late 1990s, it returned to this strategy when it again outran its credit availability. Its 
renewed interest in sales coincided with the insurance industry’s creation of its own consor-
tium, Impact Community Capital, to head off statewide CRA-like legislation that would 
regulate insurers.
  CCRC and Impact partnered on CCRC’s first large loan sale. The transaction 
included twelve loans totaling $40 million, and it sold at an aggregate price of par. Since 
both organizations were learning by doing, the transaction was protracted and painful, but it 
finally closed in August 2000. CCRC has held ten more loan sales since 2000 totaling over 
$200 million (including the first Impact sale). The sales ranged from a single loan of less 
than $1 million to a portfolio of more than $46 million. Buyers have included two other 
secondary market purchasers of community development loans (the Community Reinvest-
ment Fund, based in Minneapolis, and the Community Development Trust, based in New 
York) as well as a CCRC member bank (Bank of the West). Impact is CCRC’s largest loan 
purchaser, thanks to two subsequent loan-pool sales (see Table 1).FEDERAL RESERVE BANK OF SAN FRANCISCO
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Table 1. Recent CCRC Loan Sales to Impact Community Capital
March 2004   August 2005
Portfolio Total   $38,441,502   $46,242,763
# of Loans   25   48
Average Loan Size   1,537,660   963,391
Minimum Loan   167,841   185,042
Maximum Loan   5,159,265   3,913,427
# of Housing  
Units Financed
  1,812   2,377
% LIHTC Projects   96%   89%
Weighted Average DCR   1.38   1.56
Weighted Average LTV  
(restricted value)
  64%   64%
Weighted Ave. Months  
Since Funding
  43.2   64.0
% of Loans  
that Re-price
  68%   56%
Weighted Average Coupon   7.51%   7.48%
10 Year T-Note Yield at Price Fix   4.16%   4.17%
Sale/Offer Price Premium/
(Discount)
  3.50%   5.81%
CCRC’s Loan Sales Process
Selling loans is a lot like selling used cars. The seller usually knows much more about the 
product than the buyer, and the buyer is naturally suspicious about the seller’s motivation 
for selling. To counter this “asymmetric knowledge” discount, CCRC works to create a bid 
package that contains everything an analyst needs to value each loan without leaving his or 
her desk. When delivering the package to interested buyers, CCRC requests bidders to price 
each loan in the portfolio subject only to confirming the information in the bid package. 
  CCRC will vary the contents of the bid package depending on what it is selling and 
to whom (see Table 2). Because it takes so much effort to evaluate a loan portfolio, CCRC 
limits the distribution of bid packages to encourage each prospective bidder to conclude that 
its chances of winning the bid are good enough to be worth the effort.FEDERAL RESERVE BANK OF SAN FRANCISCO
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Table 2. Contents of a Typical CCRC Bid Package
Loan Spreadsheet Containing 50 or so data items per loan
Individual Loan Summaries
Short narratives summarizing the structure, 
credit, real estate, and participants
Loan Reviews
Dated within one year with a spread of 
historical operating statements
Collateral Inspections
Dated within 6 months, containing 
photographs of the project
Payment History Reports From loan inception
Legal Documents Loan agreement, deed of trust, note
The choice of loans to include in a sale depends on the seller’s objectives and the needs of 
the prospective buyers. If the seller’s goal is to obtain the highest possible price, for example, 
the seller should choose the loans with the highest interest rates and strongest credits. In 
selecting a recent sale portfolio, CCRC first eliminated all of the loans closed within the last 
year due to insufficient seasoning for the prospective buyers. It then eliminated all “problem” 
loans that would not be salable to the prospective buyers. Of the remaining loans, CCRC 
selected those from its largest borrower concentrations (to reduce exposure concentrations), 
and those with the lowest interest rates (to take advantage of the low market rate environ-
ment) to make up the sale portfolio.
  After selecting the sale portfolio, CCRC takes the following steps:
1.	 Prepare	the	bid	package.	The  package  includes  current  loan  reviews,  collateral 
    inspections,  and  financial  information.  Any  credit  issues  must  be  thoroughly   
  documented and explained.
2.	 Identify	potential	bidders.	Distribute to interested parties a “sanitized” (i.e.,    
  with  all  confidential  customer  information  deleted)  loan  spreadsheet  and   
  a  confidentiality  agreement.  Request  interested  bidders  to  return  the  signed   
  confiden  tiality agreement, if they want the bid package. This serves to get an early   
  read on the extent of bidder interest, weed out inappropriate bidders, and protect  
  sensitive customer information. 
3.	 Distribute	 bid	 package	 to	 bidders.	 Ask  bidders  to  respond  within  30  days 
  with  a  letter  of  intent  (LOI)  containing  a  loan-by-loan  pricing,  other   
  significant terms, sample seller representations (“reps”) and warranties, and the  
  buyer’s source of funds and approval process.FEDERAL RESERVE BANK OF SAN FRANCISCO
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4.	 Evaluate	responses	and	select	the	best	proposal.	Evaluate and compare bids on  
  price, costs of sale, terms, any requirements for residual guarantees, required reps  
  and warranties, and approvals required.
5.	 Buyer	due	diligence. This may require as long as 90 days for the selected buyer to  
  review every loan file, conduct collateral inspections, obtain title endorsements,  
  and negotiate a loan purchase agreement. Due diligence also requires considerable  
  seller’s resources to answer file reviewers’ questions, collect additional information  
  from borrowers, and, often, to correct deficiencies in documentation.
6.	 Closing. The closing involves assigning loan documents and sending loan files to  
  the buyer and confirming the receipt of the sales proceeds.
Who Are the Buyers?
The buyers of CCRC loans have been the specialized community-development secondary 
market firms and commercial banks. When considering potential purchasers, it is important 
to understand how they are funded because this will affect the types of mortgages they can 
buy and in general their flexibility. For example, a common reason for rejecting a loan from 
a sale is that it is not “Fannie Mae” compliant. In contrast, a purchaser intending to securitize 
the affordable housing loans in a larger securitization has the ability to take loans with blem-
ishes (although the price likely will be reduced) as a few of these loans in a large securitization 
can be accommodated through a larger subordination level (i.e., a larger unrated portion of 
the resulting security).
In general, we have found that the federal mortgage agencies are not flexible enough to 
be purchasers of these loans. The agencies are designed to handle large volumes of highly 
standardized product, and neither quality typically applies to CDFI loan production.
How Are Loan Portfolios Priced?
Bids on portfolios of CCRC loans have usually resulted in a wide range of prices. For 
example, bids on CCRC’s last sale ranged from 101 (i.e., a 1 percent premium) to 105. It 
is best to get bids from bidders who are familiar with the affordable housing field because 
they take into account loan strengths that other bidders may not understand. An example is 
the strength that the presence of a well-known tax credit syndicator can add to a loan with 
relatively low debt-service coverage.
A recent Ernst & Young survey found that at any one time, as many as 34 percent of 
LIHTC projects show a below break-even debt-service coverage (DSC). A low debt-service 
coverage will result in a rejected loan or a low price, unless the seller can convince the buyer 
that the low DSC is temporary. Other “events” that cause challenges for loan sellers are 
construction defect litigation, pending changes in property managers or general partners, 
the receipt of a notice of noncompliance from the tax credit agency, recent rehabilitation 
expenses, and the many other challenges that all properties face. Because such “events” can 
1   “Understanding the Dynamics II,” Ernst & Young, June 2004. The report is available at the following link: 
http://www.ey.com/global/download.nsf/US/Afforable_Housing/$file/Understanding_the_Dynamics.pdf.FEDERAL RESERVE BANK OF SAN FRANCISCO
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occur at any time, it is in the seller’s interest to minimize the time between the acceptance of 
a letter of intent and the closing of the sale.
  It is important to consider exactly when the portfolio price is fixed during the sales 
process. In recent sales, CCRC has received offers that fix the price at the acceptance of the 
letter of intent. This eliminates CCRC’s interest-rate exposure during the time between the 
acceptance of the LOI and the closing—a period of up to 120 days when the ten-year U.S. 
Treasury note rate has varied by as much as 50 basis points. A change of 50 basis points can 
mean the difference between a sale at a healthy premium and a sale at a discount.
  CCRC prices its sale portfolios beforehand with a spreadsheet model that simplisti-
cally discounts the loan cash flows to a present value without taking into account optionality 
(the borrower’s option to prepay). This model has been surprisingly accurate in the aggregate, 
although it sometimes misses on individual loans. CCRC’s portfolio valuation provides a 
benchmark against which to measure prices offered in LOIs.
Lessons Learned
There are many compelling reasons to pursue a loan sale. First, it brings in additional 
investors to create more competition for loan-pool purchases. For example, by securitizing its 
loan purchases, Impact Community Capital is able to create attractive investments for insur-
ance companies that are otherwise constrained in the amount of whole mortgages they can 
hold. Similarly, the Community Reinvestment Fund has been able to attract pension-fund 
investment into affordable housing. This increased competition ultimately lowers the cost of 
capital for the industry.
  Second, securitization creates liquidity. Successful lenders will ultimately outgrow 
their credit capacity and will be forced to sell loans or slow or even stop their growth. Loan 
sales are also a way for lenders to manage their exposure concentrations so that they can 
continue making loans to good customers without exceeding prudent borrower, geographic, 
or other exposure limits.
  Third, loan sales can improve balance sheets. In a falling interest rate environment, 
selling high-yield loans can result in substantial sale premiums, which go directly to the 
CDFI’s bottom line. Sales will also cause the recognition of any related deferred loan fees 
and the reversal of loan loss provisions, which also go to the bottom line. Nearly half of 
CCRC’s fund balance is the result of these effects of its loan sales. Loan sales can also 
demonstrate to a CDFI’s creditors and investors that its assets are properly valued (or not, 
depending on the price received) and provide them with additional comfort as to the CDFI’s 
underwriting skills.
  A CDFI should consider several disadvantages before selling loans. Lenders will 
lose servicing and interest-rate spread income they would otherwise have received from the 
sold loans. Loan sales will also increase the volatility of a CDFI’s financial statements and 
cash flow. A sale early in a fiscal year may offset the loss of servicing and spread income with 
the income recognition resulting from the sale, as discussed above. However, a sale at the FEDERAL RESERVE BANK OF SAN FRANCISCO
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end of a fiscal year may result in a “boom” year (the sale year) followed by a “bust” year (the 
following year when revenue is low because of the loss of servicing and spread income and 
the absence of an extraordinary income event).
  Another major concern for selling loans is the loss of control over subsequent 
customer contact on a loan that continues to be associated with a CDFI. CCRC has found 
that some customers whose loans were sold have valid complaints about the attitudes or lack 
of affordable housing knowledge shown by subsequent servicers. It is not surprising that a 
multi-billion-dollar servicing operation would have a different servicing approach than a 
“boutique” specialized lender like CCRC, and, as a result, the transfer of servicing may create 
an additional obstacle to getting the customer’s next loan. Sellers can insist on retaining loan 
servicing, but they will thereby eliminate bidders who intend to securitize the loans. Such 
securitizations usually require credit ratings from national credit agencies, which in turn 
usually require that the loan servicers be “rated.” (Most CDFIs will not qualify as “rated” 
servicers.)
  CDFIs may also confront issues from their funding sources resulting from sales. 
They should be wary of breakage fees or prepayment penalties for repaying a mortgage line 
early. Warehouse lenders may experience costs from getting their money back earlier than 
anticipated, and they may try to pass these costs on to the CDFI.
  CDFIs should resist providing residual guarantees that are sometimes required as 
a condition of the sale. These guarantees can greatly diminish the benefits of the sale. They 
will require continual uncompensated monitoring. A CDFI that retains the top 10 percent 
loss position in a sold loan is not really reducing its exposure concentration to that borrower. 
Nor is it getting paid for bearing the residual credit risk.
  This brings us to the core of the decision to sell loans: how to strike an appropriate 
balance between mission and loan liquidity. The secondary market values standardization 
in types of loans, loan terms, and loan documentation. Many CDFIs, however, value their 
ability to customize credit facilities to better meet their customers’ needs. Standardization 
and customization stand in direct conflict; so too do the secondary market values of large 
volumes and market risk-based pricing versus CDFI values of local orientation and making 
difficult projects happen. These conflicts force CDFIs into a delicate balancing act.
Further Innovations
CCRC is in the midst of conducting its first sale of tax-exempt bonds. We expected a thin 
market for CCRC’s small private activity housing bonds with no credit enhancement but 
were pleasantly surprised by the level of interest we found. We selected a bid from a member 
commercial bank because it seemed the most certain to close according to the proposed 
terms, but we were intrigued by a proposal from the broker/dealer subsidiary from another 
member bank to securitize the portfolio. The feasibility of securitization depends entirely on 
the existence of a large enough spread between the sale portfolio yield and the market rate 
for investment-grade rated tax-exempt securities to cover the high expenses of the transac-
tion, so a securitization will not always work. Nevertheless, we need to develop disposition FEDERAL RESERVE BANK OF SAN FRANCISCO
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alternatives for tax-exempt bonds since CCRC’s major secondary market loan purchasers as 
of yet have little appetite for the product.
George Vine has worked with CCRC since 1996 in secondary market sales, new product development, 
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